

**Electricity Act 1989**  
**Town & Country Planning (Scotland) Act 1997**  
**DPEA Code of Practice**

**Tealing to Kintore OHL proposal TRL-120-1**

**CHS Statement: Major Accident Hazard Impacts by Brian Wade**

My name is Brian Wade, speaking on behalf of NOTKUP.

Our submission is that the Environmental Impact Assessment for the TKUP project is incomplete and potentially unlawful because it fails to properly address major accident hazards and risks to human health.

The central issue is straightforward.

The proposed overhead line crosses and runs close to several high-pressure gas pipelines classified as Major Accident Hazard Pipelines.

Yet the topics of “Major Accidents and Disasters” and “Population and Human Health” were scoped out of the EIA process.

That is despite these matters being mandatory considerations under the Electricity Works Environmental Impact Assessment (Scotland) Regulations 2017.

Those regulations require decision-makers to assess risks arising from major accidents and the effects on population and human health.

In our view, that has simply not been done.

The Health and Safety Executive itself warned that the development could create the potential to initiate a major accident affecting major hazard pipelines, both during construction and potentially during operation.

The HSE advised that pipeline operators should be consulted regarding development restrictions, pipeline integrity, and protection measures.

But crucial organisations were not properly included in the scoping process.

These include:

- HSE Pipelines Division,
- National Gas Transmission,
- UKOPA,
- and the Institution of Gas Engineers and Managers.

That omission is highly significant because the proposed line does not merely cross pipelines occasionally.

In several areas it runs parallel and in close proximity to high-pressure gas infrastructure.

This creates recognised risks associated with AC induced corrosion, electrical interference, and potential mechanical damage during construction.

International standards and formal UK industry Guidance all recognise these risks.

However, the EIAR contains no meaningful modelling or quantified assessment of them.

National Gas Transmission has already confirmed in correspondence that an AC interference model has not yet been commissioned by SSEN.

Without that modelling, neither Ministers nor the public can properly understand:

- the level of risk,
- the mitigation required,
- or whether the residual risks are acceptable.

That is particularly concerning because these pipelines were originally designed on the assumption that there would be no nearby high-voltage ignition source.

Introducing major overhead transmission infrastructure materially changes the original pipeline safety case.

Under pipeline safety legislation, that change should trigger proper reassessment.

There is also a wider legal issue.

The Construction Design and Management CDM Regulations require foreseeable health and safety risks to be eliminated or reduced as far as reasonably practicable during the design stage.

Similarly, the Health and Safety at Work Act requires operators to ensure that members of the public are not exposed to avoidable risks.

In our submission, SSEN has not demonstrated compliance with those duties because the necessary hazard analysis has not yet been completed.

National Planning Framework 4 is also directly relevant.

Policy 23 specifically states that developments near major accident hazard pipelines must assess the associated risks and impacts of being located in proximity to one another.

Again, we say that has not been adequately done.

This is not a theoretical concern.

The consequences of failure involving high-pressure gas infrastructure can be catastrophic.

That is precisely why planning law, health and safety law, and industry standards require these matters to be rigorously assessed before consent is granted.

Our position is therefore not that energy infrastructure should never be built.

It is that projects of this scale must demonstrate, transparently and lawfully, that risks to public safety and human health have been fully assessed and reduced to a level that is as low as reasonably practicable.

At present, that evidence is missing.

We therefore submit that the EIAR is incomplete, that important statutory consultees were excluded, and that Ministers should not grant consent until these matters have been properly assessed.

Brian Wade

11 May 2026